

Volt

Sverige: Made in Europe

8 Pillar Plan - 2026

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1. Introduction

Over the past 15 years, Swedish politics has undergone a shift in its Overton window¹. Politics has become increasingly extreme, whilst human dignity has been sidelined by most of the established centrist parties. Instead of tackling problems from multiple angles and recognising their complexity, simple solutions are presented that do little more than treat the symptoms.

There are a number of fundamental problems in today's world and society that a serious party must address, and most of them have no simple solutions. But one thing is certain: the problems will not be solved by dividing ourselves from our neighbours, be they countries or individuals. As China expands its power using trade weapons such as the deliberate and active devaluation of the yuan and debt traps, and the US actively attempts to undermine the EU's values, we should actively work to draw closer as a union and integrate our systems with our allies on the continent, rather than trying to stand alone. For nationalism is a trap; in isolation, Sweden is weak, but together with the EU we are a strong economy and, following the free trade agreements the EU has concluded, the largest consumer market on the planet. We have power through the EU and the right to self-determination through the EU. Neither the US, China nor any other country can dictate what we should do on the world stage.

The closer the EU's member states come together and the more the EU's people are given a say, the stronger we will be. Sweden's role in this is important; Sweden is an innovator and we as a nation should set the standard within the Union for human rights and economic freedom. This requires a more active role in the EU, not only for the state but also for regions, local authorities and fellow citizens. As fellow citizens in an EU country, we need to protect what makes us strong: our view of people, economic resources and cooperation.

¹The Overton window: a concept describing which political ideas are perceived as socially and politically acceptable to discuss at any given time.

2. EU Integration

2.1. Adopt the Euro

We will remove one of the last major barriers between Sweden and the rest of the EU by adopting the Euro. The Swedish economy is already heavily dependent on the Eurozone, and we already base many decisions on what happens outside the country. Joining the Euro gives Sweden the leverage to shape these decisions.

Would Sweden lose power over its economy? While control over the currency will be reduced, Sweden gains a seat and vote on the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council. The voting system is designed to ensure that larger economies cannot dominate smaller ones.

How is this helpful for everyday Swedes? The elimination of exchange fees will facilitate foreign investment into Swedish SMEs and boost tourism from major contributor countries including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and France (Tillväxtverket, 2025). It also makes travel simpler and cheaper for Swedes visiting EU countries like Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal.

When should this happen? We are targeting 2034, the year we have both EU and national elections.

2.2. Create a European Capital Markets Union

European industry and innovation require more efficient ways to access funding. We will have Sweden support the longstanding effort to create a unified European Capital Markets Union (CMU). By harmonising rules and pooling capital, we will empower SMEs to scale within a single large market, strengthening their global competitiveness.

What happens to Swedish securities and stock exchanges? They would be integrated into the EU market, making them fully interoperable with other European systems.

How does this benefit Sweden? Swedish startups gain access to a much larger pool of investors. This leads to more successful scale-ups, which leads to more jobs and more tax revenue for Sweden.

What happens to Swedish mortgages? Mortgages of everyday people are not part of this reform. The CMU is for corporate capital.

2.3. Push for integrated EU Armed Forces

Sweden and the EU face increasingly complex international threats, particularly from our neighbour Russia. We will advocate for Sweden to integrate 27 separate national militaries into one collective EU force.

How would this be implemented? We advocate for a multi-step approach (Volt Europa, 2026). This can be done through an opt-in process for member states or by introducing a permanent force built from existing EU Battlegroups. During the transition, national militaries would continue to function.

2.4. Abolish internal EU border checks

We will end border control at the Öresund bridge. Sweden must respect EU law, which specifies that internal borders cannot be checked indefinitely (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2022). Currently, only 0.03% of people checked are refused entry, yet these measures cost 47 million SEK annually, making it a huge waste of money which could be used elsewhere (Sveriges Radio, 2025).

Will this increase illegal crossings? We see no indication that this would happen. There is currently no refugee crisis that justifies such an exceptional and costly deviation from the norm of free movement.

2.5. Increase connectivity to continental Europe

We want to strengthen the physical ties between Sweden and the rest of Europe. To tie Swedes closer to the continent, they have to feel like they are part of it. To make this a reality, we will establish and expand more routes (via railway, ferry, and air) to more European cities.

How will we ensure these connections persist? We propose that the state initially subsidise the new routes. Once established, we will drive awareness through public campaigns and sponsoring influencers to document their travels.

Will this hurt our domestic tourism industry? No. We will market these routes in both directions, using the same methods to encourage other Europeans to visit Sweden.

3. Defense

3.1. Unify European procurement for ammunition and small arms

Currently, the EU relies on 27 different national processes for the acquisition of ammunition and small arms. This fragmentation makes military systems more expensive because there is less economy of scale. We will establish a unified European procurement system, which will allow European armed forces to grow faster and work more effectively together. Also, it better allows producers to scale up production and resolve supply chain issues.

Could this be a disadvantage for smaller companies? Larger contracts could be challenging for some, but a unified market is a win for more efficient and innovative companies, who gain access to the entire European market through a single process.

3.2. Prioritise defence purchases from European companies

A robust, domestic defence industry is fundamental to European self-sufficiency. We will direct Swedish procurement toward European companies. By prioritising European defence technology over non-European alternatives, such as US equivalents, we boost our own defence companies and gain more insight and influence over the design of the technology.

Does this mean we stop cooperating with non-European allies? No. We will continue to cooperate with our global allies, but we will do so as a more capable and equal partner.

3.3. Ensure European independence for military transport and logistics

Europe is currently dependent on the US for airlift logistics. The EU maintains a heavy-lift wing in Hungary, but it is limited in capacity and reliant on US technology. To reduce risk, we will push for Sweden and the EU to invest more in heavy-lift capacity. Additionally, in Sweden we will invest in the expansion of harbours and secondary rail lines to ensure contingency in the event of conflict.

3.4. Establish an EU network of surveillance satellites

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that real-time intelligence is essential for the deployment of drones. We will push the EU to build and launch a sovereign network of surveillance satellites. This will reduce our reliance on US military agencies.

Won't this be expensive? The initial investment will be significant, but it will pay off when disaster or conflict strikes. By pooling European expertise, we drive costs down by avoiding the need for 27 different countries to develop the same technology from scratch.

Are there other ways to solve this problem? High-altitude drones and human intelligence are alternative methods, but they are riskier and can be just as expensive as a satellite program over time.

3.5. Investigate funding anti-drone technology through public-private ownership

Modern warfare requires having anti-drone defence systems that are cost-effective enough to intercept inexpensive €200 FPV drones. We will explore a model where the state provides funding to companies developing such systems in exchange for equity.

Why not just provide grants? By taking equity, we ensure that the state retains control over critical defence technology and also that taxpayers benefit from future commercial success.

3.6. Research cost-effective modular drone production

In full-scale conflict, thousands of drones can be used daily (Hudson Institute, 2025). This calls for the ability to produce inexpensive, modular FPV and midrange drones at scale. We will initiate a state research effort to scale up production methods that do not sacrifice quality or function.

Won't this be expensive? It may be, which is why we will implement fiscal guardrails. However, the cost of lacking this capability would be far higher for the Swedish taxpayer in the long run, through war costs, etc.

What about off-the-shelf drones? They are viable in terms of cost and agility, but relying on them creates an overdependence on China.

3.7. Establish a dedicated special drone unit

From the Ukraine, Hormuz, and other conflicts, it has become clear that drones represent a fundamental shift in warfare. We will establish a dedicated special drone unit within the Swedish Armed Forces, learning directly from Ukraine's units. Developing this expertise ensures we are ready to defend ourselves against modern, decentralised threats.

3.8. Fund university research for anti-drone technology

(Related to Section 3.5) To increase our preparedness for modern warfare, we will fund university programs focused on developing measures against low-cost drones, such as FPVs, long- and medium-range drones. These could be run as incubation projects for new ideas and startups.

3.9. Establish an EU Baltic Command structure

Russian aggression demands a faster, unified response in the Baltic Sea. We will lead the effort to establish an EU Baltic Command for naval and air assets in and around the Baltic Sea, i.e. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. This ensures faster, more coordinated responses to security threats, both asymmetrical and traditional.

Will such a new concept need a lot of testing? No. This is already a tried and tested concept in the EU. The Netherlands and Germany already operate forces under shared command. In addition, existing NATO structures can be adapted for this. All the countries mentioned are already used to working with each other.

Will this risk escalation with Russia? Russia might perceive this as a threat. However, Russia has continuously stated that after Ukraine, they will go after the Baltic region. We must prepare for such a scenario.

3.10. Establish a European Nuclear Umbrella

Europe is currently reliant on the US for its nuclear umbrella. This is a dependency that we must outgrow for true independence. The UK and France today have nuclear capabilities, but the UK's delivery systems are US-sourced (Trident 2) and France's arsenal is limited in scale. We will work to develop independent European carriers and nuclear capabilities to provide a credible deterrent against Russian aggression.

Will this risk escalation with Russia? Russia maintains a first-strike stance in large non-nuclear conflicts. A credible second-strike capability is the safest way to shield Europe from their nuclear weapons.

3.11. Implement drone capabilities at the squad level

To use drones to their full potential, we will ensure they are available at the lowest level of the military structure: the squad. This shortens the kill chain and makes reaction times faster. We will establish a drone operator program as a secondary speciality for soldiers, with training provided by specialists from our dedicated drone unit (described in Section 3.7).

4. Healthcare

4.1. Incorporate Dentistry within the limits of the high cost protection. Teeth are a part of the body just like any other body part.

Neglected dental care can cause heart disease (Harvard Health Publishing, n.d.) and increases risk for Alzheimer's according to research. (Kulkarni et al., 2023; Rubinstein et al., 2024)

People are avoiding going to the dentist because of high costs. As of now youth under 19 and elderly over the age of 85 have access to dentistry for free. A reform to incorporate dentistry as part of the high cost protection would not only counteract the recent removal of free dentistry for youth, it would also guarantee the right to healthcare for every individual regardless of their age or economic situation.

4.2. Make sure that every healthcare provider is connected to NPÖ

Today you may need to send for a physical copy when moving to another län or to another provider. To make moving and cooperation easier Volt will introduce a mandate to use NPÖ (Nationell patientöversikt).

4.3. Recognising Health Coaches as Healthcare Workers

Health coaches should be recognised as healthcare workers and included in the general health insurance in order to promote the illness prevention work. Their main profession is built on improving lifestyle habits.

4.4. Foster Early Neurodevelopmental Detection Collaboration

We will establish further means of cooperation to detect and diagnose NPF early in children. This process will entail better cooperation between different nodes in the child's social network such as Parents or School which will create a better foundation for effective treatments and adaptations. Early detection and diagnosis of neurological variations in children will be made possible by a close cooperation between parents, schools, social administration and pediatricians. Because early detection is essential for an effective treatment.

4.5. Strengthening Healthcare Staffing

In order to shorten waiting times for examinations and operations, the lack of personnel should be remedied by labour immigration followed by an orientation and language education. In the long run, the solution is better working conditions for all healthcare workers including doctors, nurses and assistant nurses.

5. Transportation

5.1. Give Green Cargo and SJ the duty to service the Swedish population

Currently transport lines are being shut down because it is not financially viable for GC and SJ to run them (SVT Nyheter, 2024a). But they are state companies and should therefore service the people. Keeping rail lines open is also in the interest of the military because they prefer to use rail over longer distances. When service on rail lines stops Trafikverket closes the tracks as there is no use on them; this leads to increased infrastructure decay.

5.2. Align the rail and road transportation fees

Currently the difference in fees gives road transport an unfair advantage. While rail has to pay for TonKM, road transport has to pay a blanket fee. To decrease the carbon released by transport this fee has to be standardized.

What about last mile transport?

There should be some sort of tax break for last mile transport as road transport is necessary in that case.

What about out of state lorries?

There needs to be a fee system to fairly tax them as well to not disadvantage domestic lorries.

5.3. Limit state funding to only one airport for each Region

In Sweden there are many Regioner that have more than one airport. Usually they are dominated by one airport. By only giving funding to one airport we would consolidate our resources and get more bang for our buck (Economics of scale). It would also free up land and decrease CO2 emissions.

How is this decided?

Airports have to lay out a case for why they are the most important airport both for financial reasons, emission reduction and strategically.

Would all other airports be closed?

Only some would be closed. Airports with important airstrips would be taken over by the government but not used commercially. Airports that survive without funding will still be there.

What about airports in regions that lack other infrastructure?

If there is more than 100km between the airports and the fastest travel time is more than 1hr for each 100km they are exempt by this change. Taxes collected from domestic flights will be earmarked to invest in infrastructure in the regions where this is the case.

5.4. Remove roadtax for vehicles that are exclusively used for Public transport

Lowering the cost for public transport (PT) is one of Volt's goals. This can partly be achieved by removing the road tax for vehicles that are exclusively used for PT. This would not lower the cost by much but could act as a building block in a broader move to lower costs for Citizens.

Wouldn't the removed road tax contribute to worse roads? The goal of lowering road tax is to get more vehicles off the road thereby lowering the pressure on it. The more people take the bus the longer the road holds. By reducing the price we attack the primary reason why people don't take PT which is cost.

5.5. Reduce private car usage in cities

Cars use up a lot of space in cities and contribute to a lot of preventable damage to infrastructure. Following best practices in the Netherlands and Denmark, we will mandate that municipalities reduce the land area dedicated to car use (both movement and parking) by 2040. For municipalities >150,000 residents, reduce to 50% of public space; for municipalities 50,000–150,000 residents, reduce to 65% of public space. The specifics of implementation are left to regional and local levels. Non-compliance will result in a reduction of national urban development grants. To support this transition, we will divert a portion of the national road-expansion budget to co-finance improvements for bicycle and public transport infrastructure.

5.6. Split trafikverket into Ban- and Vägverket

When Banverket and Vägverket were merged into Trafikverket much of the specialized knowledge built up by the separate agencies was slowly lost.(Lethonen, 2024) By splitting Trafikverket into its original agencies we would create the groundwork for reacquiring this knowledge and improving our infrastructure.

5.7. Create a nationwide ticket not unlike the Deutschlandticket seen in Germany.

The reduction of car usage and the CO2 saved was very noticeable in Germany after the release of the Deutschland ticket.(Johansson, 2025) It saves ordinary families money while decreasing the maintenance pressure on public roads and lowering the burn rate of Swedish oil reserves.

Wouldn't this be incredibly expensive for the Swedish taxpayer?

As money frees up in the wallets of Swedish consumers it will be spent in the economy which can be the deciding factor for getting out of the economically precarious situation Sweden is in. In addition to this, the reduction in car usage will lower the strain on public roads saving the Swedish tax payer maintenance payments.

5.8. Introduce a landing tax for domestic flights based on the distance between the airports.

Domestic air travel can largely be replaced with trains, buses and cars as the distances in Sweden are not that great. To account for the distances that warrant air travel the tax will be based on a KM multiplier that decreases the tax that has to be levied the longer the flight is.

How do we account for if the plane is fueled by a more eco fuel type or not?

This can be done through a binary variable that has a sub 1 value. This variable will then only be active for each litre of fuel that is SAF(Sustainable Aviation Fuel).

What about the areas in Sweden that rely on air travel?

Regions like northern Sweden rely on flight to connect to the capital and the existing fastest alternative is often 6 hours or longer. The proposed tax should have a cut-off based on a fastest land travel alternative of maximum 5h. The tax will also be allocated towards infrastructure projects aimed to improve and modernise alternative land travel connections such as high-speed rail and create new ones where currently not available. The allocation will be secured through specialized funds to secure funding for these projects.

5.9. Introduce more contingencies in the Swedish railways system including shunting and feeder infrastructure.

Sweden relies heavily on the main tracks known as Stambanorna. This makes it very easy to disrupt Swedish rail transportation. For the Näringslivet and Försvarsmakten a major disruption like a natural disaster or war would be devastating as Swedish roads are:

1. Not built to handle the lorry traffic that is on them as it is and increasing it would lead to major need for maintenance and
2. The distances in Sweden are very long and building out the roads would increase the societal costs more than having the cargo being transported over rail. (Trafikanalys, 2026)

Making the rail network more expansive would decrease these problems and increase the viability of the Swedish Näringsliv.

5.10. Examine the possibility of using streamlined bureaucracy to lower Infrastructure building costs.

The current administrative burden increases the cost for building to unsustainable levels. (source) This slows down the progress for much needed infrastructure (and house construction). Streamlining the process of application and compliance control in a way that does not endanger the citizens of the EU and Sweden will increase the building speed while ensuring that we don't fall behind on safety. Additionally the states ability to buy out land owners should be made easier in certain circumstances which will save cost in man hours.

How do we ensure that the state does not abuse the power given to them when buying up land?

This will be examined together with the different possibilities how this could be done. If it is found that it is impossible to make it very hard to abuse the system the problem has to be approached for a different angle.

How would a streamlining of the application and compliance process work?

It would make more of the process automatic though more data collection and automatic collaboration between the different agencies and councils.

What happens if there is no way to cut building costs through this process?

Then we would have to examine if there are other avenues available. The main thing is that it has gotten too expensive to build and this has to be solved for Sweden to remain competitive on the global and EU market.

6. Human Dignity

6.1. End the stall on EU Pay Transparency

We will resume the national implementation of the EU Pay Transparency Directive, which requires employers to disclose salary information and take corrective action where unjustified gender pay gaps exist. The current Swedish government does not intend to transpose this law, setting a troubling precedent, and in fact has called for renegotiation. We will ensure that this directive is implemented on schedule and delivers real accountability in the workplace.

Will this burden small and medium-sized enterprises? It could, particularly around reporting obligations, but we believe that we can implement these rules without disproportionate administrative costs by establishing proper guidance and phased thresholds. Companies that already pay fairly will face no extra costs, while those that don't are pushed to correct structural inequities. We don't want to create a burden; we want to create a level playing field.

6.2. Defend the Gender Recognition Act

We will defend the 2024 Gender Recognition Act (*Könstillhörighetslagen*) against attempts to repeal it. This law was a historic milestone for LGBTQ+ rights, removing the diagnosis requirement and lowering the age from 18 to 16 for legal gender recognition. We will ensure these hard-won protections remain a permanent part of Swedish law.

6.3. Legally recognise non-binary persons

We will introduce a third legal gender category to not only ensure that non-binary people are recognised by the state but also lower the stigma around gender identity. In doing so, Sweden will join countries like the Netherlands, Denmark, and Canada, who have already established a third legal gender.

Will this complicate statistics? No. A third category actually improves statistical accuracy by reflecting the true demographic reality of our society.

6.4. Immigration and Integration

We reject the polarised narratives of the far-right. On the contrary, we recognise immigration as a cornerstone of Sweden's economic and cultural vitality. Research confirms that the net fiscal contribution of immigrants is positive and projected to grow (Konjunkturinstitutet, 2025). Sweden is a global leader in immigrant well-being (Delmi, 2024), with the majority of newcomers embracing Swedish values of freedom and feeling a sense of belonging and pride (Institutet för framtidsstudier, 2019).

However, we must address the real challenges of segregation, parallel societies, and discrimination. Following our approach of evidence-based policymaking, we propose a policy program that balances humanitarian duty with structural integration.

6.4.1. Maintain humanitarian commitments

We will continue to receive quota refugees via the UNHCR. Upholding our humanitarian commitments ensures that Sweden continues to support the world's most vulnerable people.

6.4.2. Implement orientation courses for immigrants

We will implement orientation courses in all SFI and adult education centres. These courses will teach new immigrants about Swedish society, including their legal rights, how to navigate health and education systems, and societal customs and values. This will facilitate integration and establishment for newcomers.

6.4.3. Align labour immigration with demographic needs

Sweden's population is aging and the birth rate is declining, creating a labour gap. We will address this by aligning immigration policy with the needs of economic sectors and depopulating municipalities, ensuring that our welfare state remains sustainable and our towns and villages remain vibrant.

6.4.4. Ensure study support for children

We will encourage civil society organisations, higher class student volunteers, and assistant teachers to provide study support for children, particularly in vulnerable areas, where immigrant children in particular can have extra difficulty getting study support at home. Social services note that children become more vulnerable to criminal recruitment when their success in school lags. For this reason, access to study support is vital.

6.4.5. Support intercultural understanding

We will support municipalities in promoting campaigns and hosting programs about the art, traditions, and cultures of immigrant groups, in cooperation with related cultural associations. This can take the form of facilitating events to be attended by all, such as an afternoon at a school auditorium with Somali music and dance, Turkish film days at a municipal art hall, or an all-day festival with music from different lands. We will also allocate funding to these cultural associations, empowering them to organise their own events, intended to foster deeper understanding and broader acceptance within the native population.

6.4.6. Break segregation through architecture and urban planning

Sweden has marginalised neighbourhoods (*utanförskapsområden*) where patriarchal and oppressive subcultures have taken hold, affecting youth and especially girls. Instead of dealing with the factions that resist integration, we will break the structural dynamic of these areas through strategic application of spatial changes and thoughtful architectural design, rebuilding them to support a mixed social and cultural life.

Furthermore, we will prioritise expanding access to sports and the arts, providing young people with pathways to integration and personal freedom that are beyond the reach of oppressive parents.

6.4.7. Protect youth from honour-based oppression

We will mandate closer cooperation between schools and social services to protect young people at risk of honour-based violence and oppression (*hedersrelaterat våld och förtryck*).

This includes active monitoring to prevent forced re-education trips, where youth are sent to their parents' countries of origin to be forced into arranged marriages.

6.4.8. Reinforce freedom of religion through education and public discourse

We will reinforce the principles of freedom of religion and equality in the school curriculum to reduce religious discrimination. According to the World Values Survey, some women feel discomfort and exclusion when wearing headscarves. We want the government and municipalities to be more active in challenging this kind of social stigma through public communication.

6.4.9. Adequately resource Migrationsverket

We will ensure that the Migrationsverket is equipped with the personnel and digital tools necessary to handle applications efficiently and in a timely manner.

6.4.10. Restore a fair path to citizenship

We will retract the recent restrictive legislative changes regarding Swedish citizenship. We want the path to citizenship to be fair and encouraging, rather than defined by barriers. Becoming a citizen should be a milestone of long-term integration, not dangled out of reach.

6.5. Investigate tax system reforms to address the impacts of AI

Sweden's tax system was designed for a different era. Today, automation with AI and robotics are increasingly decoupling economic growth from human labour. We will fund studies around reforming the tax system to reduce its heavy reliance on payroll taxes (*arbetsgivaravgifter*).

6.6. Stop overly long detentions

Sweden has repeatedly been criticized by the United Nation Committee against Torture for having too long detention times. In Sweden the maximum detention time is nine months, but it can be extended in exceptional circumstances, but this recent change to the rules have had few if any effects on detention times, according to the Public Prosecutors Office. Pretrial detention is a serious measure, limiting the freedom of people who have not been convicted of a crime. New innovative ways to secure the state's prosecutions have to be developed, for instance by using pretrial testimony more. The only acceptable reason for pretrial detention is flight risk and the risk of more crimes, but in those cases people should be moved to special pretrial facilities, and not be put in jail or prison.

6.7. Reform youth detentions

Because of policies enacted by Swedish politicians, serious crimes are committed by younger and younger children. This was not a mistake, but the obvious effect of gradually punishing younger and younger children harder. Children, those under the age of 18, cannot vote, they cannot drive, they cannot sign a contract. But if they are used by adults for crimes, they can

be held responsible by a criminal justice system not designed for kids, which imprisons them with other young criminals, often forcing them into a life of crime and more time in prison.

Therefore children that commit crimes should be sentenced to do time in rehab facilities where they get the psychological help that they need. So that they don't repeat the behavior that got them there. In essence the state has the responsibility to treat criminals and see criminality as a sickness (therefore kriminalvården) and locking up children in normal prisons is not helping to solve the underlying issue.

Wouldn't this create an incentive for children to commit crimes?

The children that commit crime are already willing to do so and this system makes sure that the amount of minors that do commit crimes does not increase because the children that have committed crimes are less likely to become repeat offenders.

7. Energy

7.1. Create upphandlingszoner for offshore windfarms

Currently the administrative burden of finding and applying for building windfarms at sea falls on the companies that build them, causing them to lose all the money invested if the plan falls through. It is really easy for the plans to fall through because of Council Veto, Försvarsmarkten and Sjöfartsverket etc. The risk makes companies not want to invest in wind turbines in Sweden even though the cost for electricity is high. To tackle this Sweden should adopt the Danish model where the states create areas that are pre-designated for windfarms and then use a method to decide which company gets to use it. This way the administrative burden and financial risk is lowered.

How would such a zone be created?

The agencies that are affected by the plan would have to come together and show where it would be possible for them to accept wind turbines and the area where these areas intersect would be possible candidates.

7.2. Take away the council veto on critical infrastructure and energy projects

Currently a lot of infrastructure projects are delayed or cancelled due to Council veto. This risks the national interest of energy independence and transport infrastructure. By removing the veto on certain projects it would put the entirety of the Swedish population in a better position.

How would it be decided if a project doesn't have council veto?

If the state wants to remove council on a project they have to prove in court that the interests of the Swedish people are greater than the interests of the citizens living in the council. The council will not have to pay legal fees when arguing their side as it would sway the likelihood of success in the state's favour.

How can citizens defend themselves against government overreach without the veto?

Citizens will be able to hand in complaints to Förvaltningsdomstolen which will weigh them against the arguments of the state.

8. Climate

In 2015, Sweden and nearly every country in the world signed the Paris Climate Agreement. The key goal of that agreement is to limit global warming to 1.5°C, through rapid emission reductions and a commitment from every country to do its fair share. While “fair share” is a complicated legal concept, it is obvious that Sweden is far from doing enough.

As global temperatures approach the 1.5°C threshold, our stance is clear: we must reduce emissions as rapidly as possible to lead into a phase of negative emissions in order to compensate for today’s carbon budget deficits.

8.1. Reform the Climate Act for legal accountability

The Climate Act (*Klimatlagen*) sets targets but lacks mechanisms to enforce them. We will reform the Act to grant legal standing to citizens and NGOs, allowing them to challenge the state in court if government decisions contradict legislated targets. This follows successful precedents in the Netherlands and Germany.

How does this differ from the status quo? Today, Swedish courts are reluctant to hear climate cases. Claimants like Aurora must rely on the European Convention on Human Rights, a high legal bar that leads to years of procedural delays.

8.2. Implement “green budgeting”

Public spending often lacks environmental transparency, so initiatives get funded that counter legislated climate targets. We will amend the Budget Act (*Budgetlagen*) to implement Green Budgeting based on the EU Green Budgeting Reference Framework (GBRF). This follows successful precedents in France and Italy.

Under GBRF, budget items are tagged by environmental impact. In doing so, the Ministry of Finance gains climate responsibility, ensuring that environmental resources are treated as finite assets, just like tax revenues.

Will this be an administrative burden? The benefits (identifying billions of “brown” kronor) outweigh the administrative costs. Existing accounting software provides automated tagging, and GBRF provides a pre-defined taxonomy. Furthermore, GBRF allows for phased implementation, such that tags can be required only for large-scale expenditures and subsidies.

8.3. Restore the biofuel mandate

Biofuel is the most powerful lever to immediately decarbonise the millions of internal combustion engines currently on Swedish roads (Klimatpolitiska rådet et al., 2024a). To meet legislated (*Klimatlagen*) 2030 climate targets, we will restore the biofuel blending mandate (*Reduktionsplikten*).

By replacing imported fossil oil with domestic fuels derived from Swedish forestry and agricultural residues, we reduce climate emissions, strengthen the domestic economy, and improve national energy security.

How will this affect fuel prices? To prevent price shocks, the transition cost will be subsidised using revenues from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS 2) (see Section 8.4).

8.4. Earmark all EU ETS 2 revenues for climate and energy measures

Starting in 2027, the new EU Emissions Trading System (ETS 2) will place a carbon price on all transport fuels. Instead of allowing these billions to disappear into the general treasury, we will earmark 100% of Sweden's auction revenues for climate and energy measures, including funding for electrification and biofuel transitions.

8.5. Mandate zero-emission government and municipal light fleets

Private transport is the single largest source of carbon emissions (Klimatpolitiska rådet et al., 2024b). Currently, public fleets are a patchwork of *miljöbilar*, many of which are hybrids that still rely on fossil fuels. We will mandate that 100% of new light vehicles in public fleets be Zero-Emission Vehicles (ZEV), leveraging the public sector's massive purchasing power for good. Battery-electric vehicles are the best choice for ZEVs today, but this mandate remains technology-neutral, allowing for emerging alternative solutions.

Will this increase costs for the general public? Actually, it lowers them. When vehicles leave public service, they create a steady supply of affordable used ZEVs. Also, the large scale helps to lower the costs of nationwide charging and refuelling infrastructure.

8.6. Expand the “malus” tax on privately-owned ICE cars

Sweden has an annual “malus” penalty tax for high-emission vehicles, but it only applies to the first 3 years of a new car. We will expand this tax to cover all Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles, including hybrids, and extend its application for the lifetime of the vehicle. This brings Sweden in line with Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands.

Transportstyrelsen will automatically calculate this tax and provide a breakdown on every invoice, providing an information feedback loop to car owners.

What about people that lack access to a public transport connection? An exception is granted for those living more than 1.5 km from a public transport station that has at least one departure each way per hour (between 6 and 19).

What about people who need the car for work? The existing Skatteverket framework for work-related travel deductions (*reseavdrag*) applies.

8.7. Respect the EU Waste Framework Directive

We will end Sweden's current infringement of the EU Waste Framework Directive (WFD) by establishing a national textile recycling fee by June 1, 2027. This ensures we meet the mandatory milestone required by EU law.

8.8. Make repair more affordable

We want Sweden to be a leader, not a laggard, in the transition to a circular economy. We will reduce VAT for repair services to 6%. Moreover, we will expand the list of eligible services to include consumer electronics and white goods (*vitvaror*), making it cheaper to repair than to replace.

8.9. Invest defence budgets in Sustainable Aviation Fuel

We will invest defence budgets in domestic Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) production. SAF facilities act as dual-use infrastructure under NATO's civil preparedness framework: they reduce import dependency for jet fuel, strengthen supply chain resilience in a conflict scenario, and ensure operational continuity of air assets at bases like Kallax and Ronneby, without relying on import routes that can be blocked.

9. Digital Innovation and Security

9.1. Establish long-term funding for software NGOs

The best stewards of public-interest software are non-profit organisations like the Linux Foundation, Mozilla Foundation, Python Software Foundation, Signal Technology Foundation, Proton Foundation, and more. They develop software without the pressures of profit-seeking and venture-capital exits. But they need stable funding to produce software that remains reliable, safe, and modern. Existing funding from agencies like Vinnova is project-based and prioritises short-term “innovation” over long-term operational stability. But digital infrastructure really requires the same long-term care as physical roads and bridges.

We will establish a permanent, independent foundation (*stiftelse*) to provide sustained funding for European non-profit organisations that create and maintain public-interest software. To fund it, we will earmark 1% of the national R&D budget as a perpetual endowment.

Is this like Germany’s Sovereign Tech Fund? Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS) suffers from “bit rot”, where code is free and open but becomes abandoned and unmaintained. Germany’s Sovereign Tech Fund tries to address this problem by funding the development of specific FOSS components. This policy takes a different approach: it focuses on the problem of operations and maintenance, not just development. It focuses on organisations, not code.

9.2. Require sovereign European cloud infrastructure for public agencies

Currently, many Swedish agencies store data in data centres located on European soil, but these facilities are owned and operated by non-European tech companies. Under foreign laws (e.g. US CLOUD Act), these companies may be compelled to provide access to Swedish public data. This policy closes that loophole.

We will mandate that all “protected data” be stored and processed on sovereign European cloud infrastructure. This means that data is not only physically resident within European borders but also managed by entities subject exclusively to Swedish/EU legal jurisdiction. As per the EU Data Governance Act, “protected data” includes not only personal data (like healthcare records) but also sensitive public data (like critical infrastructure maps and sensor data). This mandate also ensures compliance with the EU Data Act (2026).

Isn’t this already required by GDPR? GDPR protects the individual’s right to privacy. This policy protects the nation; it enforces the sovereignty of Sweden’s data, ensuring that it is free from foreign extra-territorial reach.

9.3. Accelerate the adoption of Ena (Sweden’s federated data exchange)

Swedish agencies currently rely on proprietary software like Palantir to perform data mining. This software is built and operated by foreign companies that are subject to non-EU legal demands (e.g. the US CLOUD Act), meaning that Swedish public data can end up in foreign jurisdictions.

The alternative to data mining is federated data exchange, pioneered by Estonia's X-Road. Sweden is developing Ena², but progress is stalled. Adoption is not mandatory, and funding and development is fragmented across Digg, Vinnova, and individual agencies under a project-based model.

We will accelerate adoption of Ena by establishing a new operating agency, mirroring successful precedents in Estonia and Finland. This centralised agency will be responsible for driving the rollout of Ena across all public agencies and for its long-term technical operations. The end goal is that all data sharing and analysis across public agencies be conducted through Ena.

Why is a new agency needed? Digg (*Myndigheten för digital förvaltning*) is the architect of Ena, but it is a policy-making body, not a technical operator. The current project-based model may work for collaborative development, but it fails to provide a turn-key service, which is why agencies use Palantir.

9.4. Terminate government contracts with Palantir

A company specialising in mass surveillance, whose majority owner openly disavows liberal democratic values, is not a fit partner for the Swedish state. We will establish and execute an immediate exit plan to terminate government contracts with Palantir. (See Section 9.3 for a possible replacement solution.)

9.5. Require zero-knowledge verification for age-restricted digital services

Digital identification in Sweden today relies heavily on BankID. It works well, but it is a proprietary system that is privately owned and operated, and it requires users to share personal information, even for simple verifications.

On December 1, 2026, Sweden will launch Sverige-ID³, a state-backed digital ID aligned with the EU Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI) initiative. This new e-ID is designed to allow users to prove a fact (like "I am over 18") without revealing any personally identifying information. This is great; however, use of this functionality is not currently required.

We will mandate that any digital platform requiring age verification, such as social media, adult content websites, or alcohol e-commerce, must use a "zero-knowledge proof" method. Sverige-ID provides this, but this mandate remains technology-neutral.

What happens if platforms don't comply? Companies that do not use these privacy-protecting methods will be fined under European data laws and lose the right to integrate with the official Sverige-ID system.

9.6. Prohibit real-time facial recognition in public spaces

The Swedish Police Authority wants to use real-time facial recognition in their cameras (SVT Nyheter, 2024b) and the current government has formally proposed its approval (Regeringskansliet, 2025).

²<https://www.digg.se/styrning-och-samordning/ena---sveriges-digitala-infrastruktur>

³<https://polisen.se/tjanster-tillstand/pass-och-nationellt-id-kort/statlig-e-legitimation-sverige-id/>

While we support law enforcement, it is well-known that a real-time biometric identification infrastructure can be abused by bad actors. Therefore, we will prohibit this use of real-time facial recognition in public spaces. Mass surveillance is a direct breach of the right to privacy and a threat to democratic freedoms. Our position is supported by the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (IMY), which has warned that current proposals set the bar for suspicion too low and exceed what is permitted under the EU AI Act (Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten, 2025).

9.7. Close the privacy loophole in the Freedom of the Press Act

Sweden's privacy protections are undermined by a conflict between the GDPR and our constitutional acts, the Freedom of the Press Act (*Tryckfrihetsförordningen*) and the Freedom of Expression Act (*Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen*). Sweden uses specific GDPR exceptions to exempt cases falling under these acts, resulting in a gap in privacy protection.

The most acute loophole is how commercial data brokers abuse publishing licences (*utgivningsbevis*) to gain legal status as "media". This grants them constitutional protections intended for journalism, allowing them to bypass GDPR and commercially harvest and sell digitised public records (*allmänna handlingar*) in bulk.

We will pursue a three-pronged remedy: 1) We will amend the Public Access and Secrecy Act (*Offentlighet- och sekretesslagen*) to restrict the release of data where privacy interests are significant. 2) We will strengthen criminal provisions of the Freedom of the Press Act by expanding defamation statutes and/or introducing sanctions against entities publishing personal data without a demonstrable journalistic purpose. 3) We will review and redefine eligibility for publishing licences to ensure that they protect the free press but not the data harvesting industry.

Could this allow the state to restrict legitimate journalism? Any reform must be designed with great care. Our goal is to eliminate the loophole for commercial data-mining while ensuring the state does not gain the power to define or restrict legitimate journalism.

10. Other

10.1. Pressure the Russian shadow fleet of merchant vessels

The Russian shadow fleet is used to finance the war in Ukraine and conduct illicit activity inside and around the EU. By making trade with these ships more difficult, Sweden and the EU can decrease Russian effectiveness in both hybrid warfare and on the battlefield. We propose three key measures:

10.1.1. Expand enforcement of flag state responsibility

False flagging is used to hide tankers that are part of the sanctioned Russian export network. This practice is illegal under international maritime law (UNCLOS). In March 2026 alone, an estimated 39 shadow tankers exported Russian crude through the Baltic Sea (Kyiv School of Economics, 2026). Because these vessels operate under false flags, they can be legally intercepted. Sweden must act on existing proclamations from Baltic states (Follow the Money, 2026) and cooperate with Denmark to expand the geographical area of enforcement.

10.1.2. Expand sanctions on individuals and companies servicing the shadow fleet

A major reason the shadow fleet continues to operate, allowing Russia to export oil, is that it receives help from companies and individuals around the world. By identifying these actors and applying sanctions or diplomatic pressure, Sweden can make it significantly harder for the fleet to operate and for Russia to export its oil.

10.1.3. Increase environmental surveillance on shadow fleet vessels

Shadow fleet operations cause damage to the environment in the Baltic Sea and the seas leading to it (Kustbevakningen, 2025). Increased monitoring of these ageing vessels will allow authorities to react faster to oil spills and take decisive measures against ships dumping waste into the ocean.

10.2. Require independent schools to be non-profit

For-profit school operators currently manage a large portion of Swedish students. These independent schools (*friskolor*) rely entirely on the tax-funded school voucher (*skolpeng*), which ensures attendance remains free for all. However, under the current system, owners are permitted to retain unspent funds as profit and distribute them as dividends. This creates an incentive for private operators to cut costs to “arbitrage” a profit from the public funding, which directly reduces the money available per student.

While many praise the unique directions and identities of these schools over the “copy-paste” uniformity of municipal schools, the purpose of the schools must be for public benefit, not private profit. Therefore, we will require all independent schools to be operated by non-profit entities, such as foundations (*stiftelser*) or member cooperatives. This reform prevents the deterioration of education caused by profit-driven cost-cutting while retaining the diversity and independence of non-municipal schools. This model mirrors the successful system of the Netherlands.

What happens to existing for-profit schools? We will provide transitional legislation requiring these schools to phase out profit-making and dividends entirely within a fixed time period.

10.3. Legalise the production and use of cannabis

Cannabis poses no greater risk to users or society than alcohol, yet possession or use is currently sufficient to result in a criminal record. Criminalisation does not reduce demand; it simply forces users onto the black market, where supply remains plentiful. This exposes users to undue legal and health risk while criminal organisations profit.

We will legalise the production and use of cannabis. This move eliminates this source of criminal income and establishes strict quality and distribution controls, as just with alcohol, while generating substantial tax revenue. Legally produced cannabis will naturally outcompete the black market, as the cost premium of operating criminally already makes legal supply the cheaper option.

10.4. Enforce consequences for human rights violations

Sweden's long tradition of protecting human rights must be reflected consistently in our domestic and foreign policy. We must apply the same standards used against Russia (following the invasion of Ukraine) to all systemic violators. These include, but are not limited to, these violations:

- Israel: continued occupation and settlement expansion in the West Bank, genocide in Gaza, and the invasion of Lebanese territory with little regard for civilian casualties
- China: mass detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang involving forced labour and cultural erasure, the suppression of freedoms in Hong Kong, and decades of cultural and religious repression in Tibet
- Saudi Arabia and Iran: primary actors in the humanitarian crisis caused by the war in Yemen
- Russia: war of aggression against Ukraine while violently suppressing political dissent at home
- Myanmar: continued genocide of the Rohingya people
- UAE: principal external enabler of the ongoing war and ethnic cleansing in Sudan, alongside other actors including Egypt, Libya, and again Russia.

Sweden must exert political and diplomatic pressure on these violators. In cases where violations continue in a systemic manner, we demand that Sweden exert more direct pressure through arms embargoes (particularly against Israel), coordinating EU-wide boycotts, and the suspension of trade deals and other association treaties.

Local governments, as demonstrated by the municipality of Utrecht, should also impose boycotts, which serve two purposes: 1) They are recognised as effective measures to urge countries to change, as exemplified by the end of the apartheid in South Africa. 2) They relieve Sweden of its moral complicity in these human rights violations.

How do we ensure education and research don't contribute to violations? We will require higher education and research institutions to fully disclose all ties to foreign institutions. Independent boards of staff and students will evaluate and report on these collaborations to ensure that they align with their own ethical codes.

10.5. Reform the electoral system

The Swedish electoral system has many strengths, but it requires modernisation to address environmental waste, tactical voting, and administrative inefficiency.

10.5.1. Implement electronic voting with paper confirmation

The current electoral system, based on an impractical amount of paper ballots, is a relic of the past. Printing over half a billion ballots for only 20 million votes cast is an unacceptable waste of our forests. Furthermore, the selection of ballots at polling places leads to delays and long lines, which has been shown to depress turnout and threaten democracy (Pettigrew, 2021).

We propose an electoral system much like the one we use today, with the big difference that ballots are printed at the polling place by the voter, fully on-demand. This can be implemented without any other changes to the current system.

Early voting would even be improved, as machines can show voters the parties running in their specific elections. The physical ballots remain to create a paper trail (known as Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail, or VVPAT)⁴ to confirm machine results, while the electronic machines allow preliminary results to be counted and delivered within minutes of polls closing.

What would a polling place look like? Instead of having one area to collect ballots and a number of privacy shields protecting the envelope-stuffing areas, there are only privacy shields protecting electronic voting machines. Voters go directly to these machines, where they make their votes, print their ballot, fold it, and hand it to poll workers, who put it in the ballot box.

What about people who can't operate the machines? Professional poll workers can help those people and instruct them how to print their ballots. Already today, some people require support to successfully select their ballots and put them in envelopes.

Why can't the elections be fully digital? Digitalisation is not a simple solution. The secret ballot must be protected against hacking, and there must be a way to verify the results in order to maintain public trust.

In a fully digital election, there is no way to reasonably confirm the results. No one can really know that the votes were registered correctly, if the votes were confirmed by poll workers and the public after the election. This problem is accentuated for regular voters who might not be well versed in computer science.

Machines that print physical ballots provide a paper trail that poll workers and the public can use to confirm results, achieving the perfect balance across ease-of-use, trustability, and reduced waste.

10.5.2. Introduce contingent voting

Enabled by machine-printed ballots (see Section 10.5.1), we will introduce contingent voting.⁵ This gives voters an optional transferable vote: the ability to select a second choice, which is used in case their first choice does not clear the 4% minimum threshold for Parliament (*fyraprocentsspärren*).

⁴https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter-verified_paper_audit_trail

⁵https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote

Today, the Swedish electoral system often discourages people from voting for their preferred party, and both small and large parties suffer as a result. The system hurts new and smaller parties because voters fear their vote will be wasted if the party falls short of the threshold. This forces “tactical voting”, where voters feel the need to vote for a party that is not their favourite, just to avoid wasting their ballot. Conversely, larger parties are hurt when their own supporters feel the need to give “support votes” for smaller allies to keep them in Parliament.

With this simple reform, the need for both tactical voting and support voting is removed, so all voters can finally vote for their favourite party.

Would the secondary vote delay the results? No. On election night, only primary votes would be counted. In the rare case an established party doesn’t clear the hurdle, one could usually assume what those voters chose as a second option. The actual secondary votes would be counted later by the municipalities and regional boards during the ordinary recounts.

10.5.3. Allow voting anywhere in the municipality

Voting should be as accessible as possible. However, the current system is overly restrictive, as it was designed for an era when records were managed on physical paper ledgers at a local parish level. Today, these administrative boundaries are outdated relics. We will reform this to allow any eligible person to vote at any polling station within the municipality where they reside. This change removes unnecessary barriers that discourage participation.

10.6. Enshrine non-retroactivity for immigration law

Recent shifts in migration policy have eroded the rights of immigrants. While citizens have an absolute right to remain in Sweden, immigrants naturally hold a more uncertain legal status. Especially for those who have already settled, integrated, and contributed to our society for years, the arbitrary tightening of terms is a stain on Sweden’s history of humanism. We will amend the second chapter of the Instrument of Government (*Regeringsformen*) to protect an immigrant’s right to stay under the terms that were applicable at the time of their arrival.

Does this mean the state can never change immigration law? No, the state remains free to update laws for future arrivals. This reform only ensures the principle of non-retroactivity, i.e. that rules of the game cannot be changed “mid-play” for those already here.

10.7. Introduce a tiered work visa system

We will reform Sweden’s visa system by simplifying migration rules to ensure labour market balance and employer responsibility.

Based on Singapore’s successful model, we propose three permit levels:

- (*Arbetsstillstånd III*): For highly skilled workers. Requires salary above 1 PBB/month (2 PBB if over 45) and relevant qualifications. No quota limits.
- (*Arbetsstillstånd II*): Mid-skilled workers. Limited to 25% of a company’s workforce. Requires salary above 0.5 PBB/month and upper secondary education. Employers must provide insurance, housing, and travel.

- (*Arbetsstillstånd I*): Entry-level workers. Limited to 25% of an industry segment. Fast processing (24h). Requires basic education. Employers must provide insurance, housing, and travel.

Temporary permits (*tillfälliga uppehållstillstånd*) for 5 years will be linked to Permit II and III. Permanent residence will be tied to long-term employment, especially under Permit III.

What's wrong with the current system? Currently, Sweden's employer-driven system treats all roles similarly, making it both restrictive and inefficient. High-skilled workers choose other countries with clearer pathways, while employers in low- and mid-skilled sectors face chronic labour shortages or turn to informal, unregulated jobs. This can increase exploitation, reduce tax revenue, and weaken overall labour market control. At the same time, unclear rules undermine public trust in migration policy, as the system currently appears neither strict nor functional.

10.8. Prioritise re-employment over job protection

Sweden's labour market regulations need reform to make it easier for unemployed individuals to obtain new employment. Current rules, including *Lagen om anställningsskydd (LAS)*, increase hiring risks, reduce labour market mobility, and disproportionately affect those who are already outside the workforce.

We want to transition toward a system inspired by Denmark's successful "flexicurity" model, which shifts focus from protecting specific roles to supporting lifelong career growth. This model involves the following:

- Lowering hiring barriers by simplifying dismissal rules
- Maintaining strong income security during unemployment
- Expanding retraining and transition support
- Encouraging entrepreneurship as an alternative pathway into work (currently, founders risk losing their unemployment insurance before business ideas are even established)

Our goal is a labour market where job loss might be more common but also more temporary, while re-employment is faster and more multifaceted.

Doesn't easier dismissal make workers less secure? Security shifts from the specific job to the worker. By providing high income security and expanded retraining support, we ensure better opportunities for the individual and a more dynamic labour market for the country, resulting in greater overall stability.

10.9. Make appeals in criminal cases specific

In Sweden today, when a criminal judgement is appealed, the whole trial is always redone by a court of appeals. This is both incredibly wasteful, but it also means that there is no effective right to appeal in Sweden. When the court of appeals redo the whole trial, it is as if the first process in the district court never happened. By making appeals specific and requiring the appellant to complain at a specific part of a lower court judgement, only that question has to be retried at a higher level. This will give criminal defendants a more proper appellant review, while also saving the government money today spent on doing the same thing twice.

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